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A Data
S1 Table: Number of Participants in Each Game
Experiment 1
Large
Experiment 1
Small
Experiment 2
Large
Experiment 2
Small
Total # of Participants 393 240 402 183
Games1
Beauty Contest2 198 137 378 169
(2) (15) (4) (17)
Voter Turnout Game3 388 224 383 170
(4) (23) (4) (17)
Public Good Game4 388 235 390 170
(4) (24) (4) (17)
Ultimatum Game 384 231 383 170
Risk Elicitation 378 229 386 173
Centipede Game 363 217 365 164
Trust Game 364 226 379 172
Math Competition 386 234 380 171
1 This table shows the number of players included in the analysis. For the beauty contest game, the
voter turnout game and the public good game, the number of groups are shown in the parenthesis.
2 For the beauty contest game, we exclude two large groups (with only 22 and 48 players) and one
small group (with only 3 players) in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, one large group (with only 1
player) and one small group (with only 5 players) are excluded from the analysis.
3 For the voter turnout game, one small group with only 3 players in Experiment 2 is excluded from
the analysis.
4 For the public good game, one small group (with only 3 players) in Experiment 1 and one small group
(with only 4 players) are excluded from the analysis.
This data set consists of the survey data and game-play data from Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2. In this study, we use and analyze data from players who participated in at 
least one of the eight games. Since the whole experiment is implemented on players’ mobile 
phones, it is possible that the players leave the app during the experiment. In S1 Table, we 
report the number of participants in each game of our analysis.
Moreover, from the pre-game survey, we are able to collect demographic data on each
player’s gender, place of origin, cognitive reflection test (CRT) score and their scores on China’s
National College Entrance Examination (NCEE), commonly known as the Gaokao score. In
1
S2 Table, we report the summary statistics of thse demographic variables. In addition, we 
summarize the players’ provinces of birthplace and school in S3 Table
. Finally, in S4 Table, we describe the key variables in the analysis.
S2 Table: Summary Statistics of Demographic Variables
N Missing Mean SD Median Max min
Experiment 1
Female 631 2 0.743 0.437 1 1 0
CRT Score 629 4 0.876 0.225 1 1 0
Gaokao Score 532 101 590.2 70.95 607.0 762 360
Experiment 2
Female 566 19 0.781 0.414 1 1 0
CRT Score 579 6 0.877 0.235 1 1 0
Gaokao Score 564 21 583.0 70.55 599.5 1000 349
2
S3 Table: Number of Observations by Birthplace and School
Birthplace School
Province Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Anhui 40 21 35 23
Beijing 1 22 10 39
Chongqing 14 9 17 7
Fujian 79 128 71 90
Gansu 9 3 4 1
Guangdong 14 16 17 18
Guangxi 12 6 8 3
Guizhou 5 2 5 2
Hainan 2 3 3 4
Hebei 23 6 31 6
Heilongjiang 5 6 7 0
Henan 40 14 34 8
Hubei 29 83 12 51
Hunan 43 65 34 53
Inner Mongolia 7 1 5 1
Jiangsu 46 32 40 34
Jiangxi 39 13 31 13
Jilin 8 23 9 22
Liaoning 14 25 18 14
Ningxia 1 2 1 1
Qinghai 1 1 0 1
Shaanxi 12 19 6 19
Shandong 52 8 29 13
Shanghai 4 7 4 11
Shanxi 24 0 23 0
Sichuan 49 103 59 129
Tianjin 1 8 5 6
Xinjiang 3 2 1 1
Yunnan 8 1 9 1
Zhejiang 44 2 38 1
Missing 4 2 19 13
3
S4 Table: Summary of Variables
Variables Description
Basic Variables
Female Dummy variable equals to 1 if the player is female.
Gaokao Score Self-reported Gaokao score standardized around the sample average.
CRT Score The correction rate of cognitive reflection test.
Risk Aversion
# of safe options chosen in risk elicitation task standardized around the
sample average.
Gameplay Math
Score
The higher number of correct puzzles in the first two stages of the math
competition game standardized around the sample average.
Tournament
Dummy variable equals to 1 if the player chooses “tournament” in the
math competition game.
Strategic Behavior
Initial Guess The first guess in the beauty contest game.
Follow BNE
1
Ni
∑Ni
j=1 1{i follows EQ cutoff strategy in round j} where Ni is the
number of rounds that player i has participated.
Node 1 Take Rate The average take rate at the first node of the centipede game.
Node 2 Take Rate
The average take rate at the second node of the centipede game
(conditional on player 1 passes).
Strong Free Rider
1
Ni
∑Ni
j=1 1{contribution in round j = 0} where Ni is the number of
rounds that player i has participated.
Free Rider
1
Ni
∑Ni
j=1 1{contribution in round j ≤ 6} where Ni is the number of
rounds that player i has participated.
Altruist
1
Ni
∑Ni
j=1 1{contribution in round j ≥ 14} where Ni is the number of
rounds that player i has participated.
Proposal Offer Proportion of pie offered to the responder in the ultimatum game.
Acceptance Dummy variable equals to 1 if the responder accepts the offer.
Investment Proportion of endowment offered to the second mover in the trust game.
Return
The ratio between the amount of return and the amount of investment
from the investor in the trust game (conditional on that the investor does
not invest 0).
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B Supplementary Individual Game Analysis
B.1 Beauty Contest Game
S5 Table: Beauty Contest Summary Statistics
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median
Group A (Large)
Round 1 178 31.58 20.23 30.0 357 35.80 20.42 34.0
Round 2 188 24.14 15.75 20.0 372 25.27 15.96 22.0
Round 3 190 14.31 9.366 12.0 374 16.18 12.03 13.0
Group B (Small)
Round 1 115 37.39 22.05 34.0 166 38.75 22.14 35.5
Round 2 124 32.25 19.39 28.5 162 29.59 18.18 25.0
Round 3 122 24.31 14.83 21.0 162 20.97 15.59 18.0
1. In Experiment 1, there are 4 groups in Group A and 16 groups in Group B. Due to a
connection error, there are 2 groups in Group A that have less than 70 players and 1 group
in Group B having less than 7 players. These 3 groups are excluded from the group size
effect analysis.
2. In Experiment 2, there are 5 groups in Group A and 18 groups in Group B. There is one
group in Group A having only one player and and one group in Group B having only five
players due to the lagged connection. These two groups are excluded from the group size
effect analysis.
S6 Table: P-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests
Large vs. Small Exp 1 vs. Exp 2
Experiment 1 Large Group
Round 1 0.080 Round 1 0.004
Round 2 0.000 Round 2 0.407
Round 3 0.000 Round 3 0.074
Experiment 2 Small Group
Round 1 0.251 Round 1 0.669
Round 2 0.091 Round 2 0.199
Round 3 0.000 Round 3 0.009
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In this section, we provide further evidence in favor of the differential effect of group size on 
convergence to the equilibrium prediction. First of all, in S5 Table, we report the summary 
statistics of the guesses and the p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are summarized in S6 
Table. From the table, we can observe that the group size effect is more significant in the later 
rounds and guesses are similar in Experiments 1 and 2. S1 and S2 Figs show the scatter plots of 
the second guesses against the first guesses and scatter plots of the third guesses against the 
second guesses for both the Large groups (first column) and Small groups (second column) in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Moreover, we conduct the same analysis on the data from Nagel (1995) 
(third column) in order to compare our result with the literature.
Slope = .418A
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Se
co
nd
 G
ue
ss
0 20 40 60 80 100
First Guess
Experiment 1 Large Group (First to Second Guess)
Slope = .597C
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Se
co
nd
 G
ue
ss
0 20 40 60 80 100
First Guess
Experiment 1 Small Group (First to Second Guess)
Slope = .215E
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Se
co
nd
 G
ue
ss
0 20 40 60 80 100
First Guess
Nagel (1995) Data (First to Second Guess)
Slope = .31B
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Th
ird
 G
ue
ss
0 20 40 60 80 100
Second Guess
Experiment 1 Large Group (Second to Third Guess)
Slope = .379D
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Th
ird
 G
ue
ss
0 20 40 60 80 100
Second Guess
Experiment 1 Small Group (Second to Third Guess)
Slope = .463F
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Th
ird
 G
ue
ss
0 20 40 60 80 100
Second Guess
Nagel (1995) Data (Second to Third Guess)
S1 Fig: Observations over time from Experiment 1. Figure A and C show the transitions from 
the first guess to the second guess. Figure B and D two figures show the transitions from the 
second guess to the third guess. Figure E and F show the transitions in Nagel (1995). The black 
dotted line is the 45 degree line and the red line is the best fitted line overlaid with 95% CI.
The figures clearly reveal that guesses are more closely clustered in the neighborhood
of zero in both transition graphs of the Large groups as compared with the Small groups
indicating a faster convergence in the latter. Moreover, we can actually quantify the speed
of convergence from the change of slopes. In the Large groups of Experiment 1, the slopes
are 0.418 (β̂ = 0.418, t = 5.27, p < 0.001, 95% C.I. = [0.261, 0.574]) and 0.310 (β̂ = 0.310, t =
3.97, p < 0.001, 95% C.I. = [0.156, 0.464]) which are smaller than the slopes for the Small
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groups which are 0.597 (β̂ = 0.597, t = 8.91, p < 0.001, 95% C.I. = [0.464, 0.730]) and 0.379
(β̂ = 0.379, t = 4.77, p < 0.001, 95% C.I. = [0.221, 0.537]), indicating the convergence in Large
groups is faster than the Small groups.
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S2 Fig: Observations over time from Experiment 2. Figure A and C show the transitions from 
the first guess to the second guess. Figure B and D two figures show the transitions from the 
second guess to the third guess. Figure E and F show the transitions in Nagel (1995). The black 
dotted line is the 45 degree line and the red line is the best fitted line overlaid with 95% CI.
In addition, we can find that the speed of convergence in Experiment 2 is quantitatively
similar to Experiment 1. The slopes of the Large groups are 0.371 (β̂ = 0.371, t = 10.39, p <
0.001, 95% C.I. = [0.301, 0.441]) and 0.282 (β̂ = 0.282, t = 6.43, p < 0.001, 95% C.I. =
[0.196, 0.368]). On the other hand, the slopes of the Small groups are 0.329 (β̂ = 0.329, t =
5.10, p < 0.001, 95% C.I. = [0.202, 0.457]) and 0.429 (β̂ = 0.429, t = 6.98, p < 0.001, 95% C.I. =
[0.308, 0.550]). This shows that in Experiment 2 the convergence in Large groups is also faster
than the Small groups.
Finally, compared with the data from Nagel (1995), we can observe that the speed of con-
vergence is quantitatively similar in both experiments. While the convergence from the first
round to the second round in Nagel (1995) is smaller (β̂ = 0.215, t = 1.25, p = 0.216, 95% C.I. =
[−0.129, 0.558]), the convergence from the second round to the third round is indeed compara-
ble (β̂ = 0.463, t = 2.01, p = 0.048, 95% C.I. = [0.003, 0.922]). This comparison demonstrates
the robustness of our result in terms of the speed of convergence.
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S3 Fig reports on our classification of players by strategic sophistication using the initial 
guesses in the beauty contest game. Here we follow Nagel (1995) to assign level 0 status to those 
whose guess is greater than the midpoint of the interval, i.e. L0 = [50, 100], and then proceeds 
iteratively using the midpoint of 50, so that L1 types are those whose guesses are less than 50 
but greater than or equal to 2/3 × 50, or in the range [33.33, 50); L2 players have guesses in 
[22.22, 33.33); L3 players have guesses in [14.8, 22.1] and >L3 types have guesses in [0, 14.7]. S3 
Fig shows the distribution of both level-k type classifications in both Experiments 1 and 2. The 
result shows that level 0 is the most common type, followed by levels 1 then 2 then 3, which is a 
common finding in this literature, e.g. as in Nagel (1995). In addition, the distributions in 
Experiments 1 and 2 are not significantly different (Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test: KS = 0.0727, p 
= 0.148).
KS Test p−value = .148
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S3 Fig: The distribution of levels based on the initial guess in the beauty contest game. The blue 
bars and red bars show the classification results from Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. The p-
value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is provided in the figure.
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B.2 Voter Turnout Game
In this section, we report the summary statistics for the voter turnout game in S7 Table, which 
are visualized in Figure 2 of the main text. Moreover, to examine the group size effect and the 
consistency between Experiment 1 and 2, we conduct Mann-Whitney ranksum tests and report 
the p-values in S8 Table. From the table, we can observe that the results are similar in 
Experiments 1 and 2 but we can only find weak group size effects.
S7 Table: Voter Turnout Game Summary Statistics
Experiment 1
Large
Experiment 1
Small
Experiment 2
Large
Experiment 2
Small
N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
Majority
Round 1 215 0.698 0.460 141 0.780 0.416 246 0.764 0.425 116 0.828 0.379
Round 2 244 0.672 0.470 154 0.701 0.459 248 0.677 0.468 114 0.702 0.460
Round 3 252 0.552 0.498 147 0.667 0.473 251 0.518 0.501 116 0.586 0.495
BNE Prediction 0.101 0.258 0.101 0.258
Minority
Round 1 109 0.615 0.489 57 0.649 0.481 123 0.431 0.497 51 0.608 0.493
Round 2 120 0.483 0.502 66 0.591 0.495 126 0.429 0.497 49 0.347 0.481
Round 3 124 0.403 0.493 63 0.492 0.504 124 0.371 0.485 50 0.340 0.479
BNE Prediction 0.123 0.292 0.123 0.292
1. There is one small group in Experiment 2 being excluded from the analysis since the group has only three players.
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S8 Table: P-values of Mann–Whitney Ranksum Tests
Large vs. Small Exp 1 vs. Exp 2
Experiment 1 (Majority) Large Group (Majority)
Round 1 0.0868 Round 1 0.1074
Round 2 0.5428 Round 2 0.9005
Round 3 0.0241 Round 3 0.4497
Experiment 1 (Minority) Large Group (Minority)
Round 1 0.6641 Round 1 0.0053
Round 2 0.1611 Round 2 0.3896
Round 3 0.2478 Round 3 0.6028
Experiment 2 (Majority) Small Group (Majority)
Round 1 0.1718 Round 1 0.3436
Round 2 0.6438 Round 2 0.9936
Round 3 0.2230 Round 3 0.1802
Experiment 2 (Minority) Small Group (Minority)
Round 1 0.0340 Round 1 0.6589
Round 2 0.3248 Round 2 0.0100
Round 3 0.7013 Round 3 0.1059
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B.3 Public Goods Game
In this section, we report the summary statistics for the public goods game in Supplementary 
Tables 9 and 10, which are visualized in Figure 3 of the main text. The summary statistics 
for the amount of contributions and the proportion of altruists are reported in S9 Table. 
Besides from analyzing the free-riding behavior, we further separate out the “strong free-
riding behavior”—which is the frequency that a player contributes exactly 0 to the public 
good. The summary statistics of (strong) free-riding behavior are reported in S10 Table
Moreover, in order to test the existence of the group size effect, we conduct Mann-Whitney 
ranksum tests (where large and small groups having the same median is the null hypothesis) 
and report the p-values in S11 Table. Finally, in S12 Table, we compare the results in 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 by reporting the p-values of Mann-Whitney ranksum tests.
The result shows that the group size only has mild effect on the experimental results and 
this is finding is replicated in Experiment 2. In order to understand why group size does not 
seem to matter in our experiment, in S4 Fig we also report on the percentage of certain player 
types each round and overall rounds that we could identify using our data. Following Isaac et al. 
(1994), players are classified as strong free riders if they give 0 in a round; a (weak) free rider if 
they give less than 1/3 of their endowment in a round and an altruist if they give at least 2/3 of 
their endowment in a round. The overall round classification (S4 Fig (1E) and (2E)) requires 
that a player was a certain type for at least 1/2 of all rounds of the game.
While we generally observe little to no difference in the percentages of (weak) free riders
between the Large and Small group treatments, we find that in the Large group treatment we
have more Strong free riders and Altruists than in the Small group treatment (Experiment 1
χ2-test: χ2(3) = 16.091, p = 0.001; Experiment 2 χ2-test: χ2(3) = 6.928, p = 0.074). That
is, there is a greater heterogeneity of player types in the Large group treatment; the greater
numbers of Altruists and Strong Free riders in the Large group treatment off-set one another
so that on average, there is no difference in group contributions between the Large and Small
groups. Compared with the data from Isaac et al. (1994), we can also observe the same pattern
in their data—when the group size gets larger, the more heterogeneous the player types are.
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S9 Table: Average proportion of endowment contributed and alutrists
Experiment 1
Large
Experiment 1
Small
Experiment 2
Large
Experiment 2
Small
N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
% of Endowment
Contributed
Round 1 356 0.345 0.279 224 0.314 0.246 311 0.254 0.242 151 0.311 0.253
Round 2 369 0.382 0.297 226 0.350 0.258 369 0.285 0.275 162 0.282 0.243
Round 3 362 0.381 0.333 222 0.355 0.264 375 0.312 0.314 160 0.269 0.256
Round 4 359 0.361 0.337 220 0.341 0.267 377 0.319 0.328 164 0.274 0.266
Round 5 358 0.305 0.327 220 0.307 0.249 379 0.298 0.322 164 0.256 0.271
Round 6 360 0.252 0.308 223 0.261 0.240 379 0.249 0.290 167 0.222 0.262
Round 7 369 0.253 0.316 226 0.221 0.242 377 0.214 0.285 168 0.208 0.239
Round 8 245 0.210 0.305 214 0.197 0.251 379 0.183 0.277 170 0.181 0.229
% of Altruists
Round 1 356 0.118 0.323 224 0.103 0.304 311 0.058 0.234 151 0.079 0.271
Round 2 369 0.171 0.377 226 0.111 0.314 369 0.092 0.290 162 0.068 0.252
Round 3 362 0.213 0.410 222 0.144 0.352 375 0.163 0.370 160 0.069 0.254
Round 4 359 0.209 0.407 220 0.114 0.318 377 0.170 0.376 164 0.085 0.280
Round 5 358 0.156 0.364 220 0.077 0.268 379 0.161 0.368 164 0.085 0.280
Round 6 360 0.119 0.325 223 0.076 0.266 379 0.103 0.304 167 0.084 0.278
Round 7 369 0.127 0.334 226 0.066 0.249 377 0.101 0.301 168 0.042 0.200
Round 8 245 0.127 0.333 214 0.075 0.264 379 0.082 0.274 170 0.041 0.199
1 Notice that Altruist is a dummy variable which equals to 1 when the proportion of endowment contributed is greater
or equal to 2/3.
2 We exclude one small group in Experiment 1 (with only 3 players) and one small group in Experiment 2 (with only 4
players) from the analysis.
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S10 Table: Average proportion of (strong) free riders
Experiment 1
Large
Experiment 1
Small
Experiment 2
Large
Experiment 2
Small
N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
% of Strong Free Rider
Round 1 356 0.124 0.330 224 0.107 0.310 311 0.215 0.412 151 0.166 0.373
Round 2 369 0.133 0.340 226 0.097 0.297 369 0.209 0.407 162 0.173 0.379
Round 3 362 0.193 0.395 222 0.117 0.322 375 0.243 0.429 160 0.238 0.427
Round 4 359 0.242 0.429 220 0.127 0.334 377 0.263 0.441 164 0.213 0.411
Round 5 358 0.302 0.460 220 0.168 0.375 379 0.266 0.443 164 0.238 0.427
Round 6 360 0.333 0.472 223 0.202 0.402 379 0.322 0.468 167 0.293 0.457
Round 7 369 0.333 0.472 226 0.235 0.425 377 0.363 0.482 168 0.292 0.456
Round 8 245 0.412 0.493 214 0.327 0.470 379 0.417 0.494 170 0.341 0.476
% of Free Rider
Round 1 356 0.559 0.497 224 0.634 0.483 311 0.684 0.465 151 0.589 0.494
Round 2 369 0.491 0.501 226 0.535 0.500 369 0.631 0.483 162 0.660 0.475
Round 3 362 0.506 0.501 222 0.527 0.500 375 0.624 0.485 160 0.675 0.470
Round 4 359 0.535 0.499 220 0.550 0.499 377 0.605 0.490 164 0.677 0.469
Round 5 358 0.623 0.485 220 0.595 0.492 379 0.633 0.483 164 0.695 0.462
Round 6 360 0.714 0.453 223 0.655 0.477 379 0.691 0.463 167 0.766 0.424
Round 7 369 0.732 0.444 226 0.765 0.425 377 0.748 0.435 168 0.774 0.420
Round 8 245 0.784 0.413 214 0.776 0.418 379 0.807 0.395 170 0.806 0.397
1. Strong free rider is a dummy variable which equals to 1 when the player exactly contributes 0.
2. Free rider is a dummy variable which equals to 1 when the proportion of endowment contributed is less or equal to 1/3.
3 We exclude one small group in Experiment 1 (with only 3 players) and one small group in Experiment 2 (with only 4 players)
from the analysis.
13
S11 Table: P-values of Mann–Whitney Ranksum Tests
Large vs. Small
Contribution Altruist Strong Free Rider Free Rider
Experiment 1
Round 1 0.3237 0.5699 0.5491 0.0745
Round 2 0.2994 0.0452 0.1959 0.2883
Round 3 0.9516 0.0392 0.0159 0.6141
Round 4 0.7157 0.0033 0.0008 0.7222
Round 5 0.0882 0.0055 0.0003 0.5111
Round 6 0.0187 0.0954 0.0006 0.1331
Round 7 0.4783 0.0182 0.0104 0.3596
Round 8 0.2922 0.0683 0.0601 0.8372
Experiment 2
Round 1 0.0144 0.3775 0.2085 0.0433
Round 2 0.6520 0.3562 0.3403 0.5210
Round 3 0.4750 0.0036 0.8983 0.2612
Round 4 0.5564 0.0103 0.2236 0.1116
Round 5 0.5849 0.0192 0.4833 0.1650
Round 6 0.6379 0.4884 0.5088 0.0735
Round 7 0.2548 0.0207 0.1032 0.5177
Round 8 0.1446 0.0833 0.0935 0.9671
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S12 Table: P-values of Mann–Whitney Ranksum Tests
Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2
Contribution Altruist Strong Free Rider Free Rider
Large Groups
Round 1 0.0000 0.0068 0.0015 0.0009
Round 2 0.0000 0.0016 0.0062 0.0001
Round 3 0.0035 0.0819 0.1056 0.0012
Round 4 0.0867 0.1752 0.5275 0.0555
Round 5 0.9460 0.8667 0.2899 0.7717
Round 6 0.7444 0.4745 0.7408 0.5022
Round 7 0.1252 0.2537 0.3893 0.6120
Round 8 0.4746 0.0683 0.9086 0.4715
Small Groups
Round 1 0.8387 0.4492 0.1002 0.3852
Round 2 0.0101 0.1532 0.0288 0.0137
Round 3 0.0010 0.0216 0.0019 0.0038
Round 4 0.0048 0.3649 0.0243 0.0121
Round 5 0.0067 0.7737 0.0907 0.0447
Round 6 0.0166 0.7840 0.0366 0.0170
Round 7 0.4032 0.2915 0.2008 0.8465
Round 8 0.7169 0.1688 0.7717 0.4721
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B.4 Ultimatum Game
S13 Table: Ultimatum Game Summary Statistics
N Mean SD Median
Experiment 1
Proposal Offer 313 36.22 15.47 40.0
Acceptance 302 0.699 0.460 1
Experiment 2
Proposal Offer 277 36.91 15.68 40.0
Acceptance 276 0.775 0.418 1
The fourth game in our playlist was a two-player ultimatum game, originally studied 
by Güth et al. (1982) and subsequently by many others. In this 2-player, take-it-or-leave-it 
bargaining game, the first mover proposes a split of a pie of 100 points between herself and the 
second mover. The second mover sees the proposed split and must decide whether to accept 
the proposal or reject it. In the case of acceptance, the pie is split between the first mover 
and the second mover in accordance with the first mover’s proposed allocation. If the second 
mover rejects, then both players earn 0. As this is an one-shot game, working backwards, the 
second mover should accept any positive offer by the first mover and is indifferent between 
a 0 offer and rejection. Thus, the strict subgame perfect Nash equilibrium calls for the first 
mover to make the minimum positive offer (here 1 point) and for the second mover to accept 
this offer. We had all subjects in our experiment play this 2-player game just one time, with 
random assignment to either the first or the second mover roles. The results are shown in S5 Fig.
The first two panels show the distributions of proposal offers from the first mover offered to
the second mover and the second mover’s acceptance rate, conditional on the offered amount.
Notice that offers to the second mover are nearly always 50 percent or less of the pie size
(≤ 50 points), and the conditional acceptance rate is monotonically increasing with the amount
offered to the second mover. This finding is consistent with the literature, e.g. Roth et al.
(1991) and Lin et al. (2020). Moreover, in the bottom two panels, we compare our data with
Roth et al. (1991) by conducting the same analysis. From the figure, we can observe that no
matter in the distribution of proposal offers or the conditional acceptance rate, both data sets
obtain similar results, showing the robustness of our result.
S6 Fig1 shows the second mover (responder)’s reaction times (in sec-
1To ensure our analysis is not skewed by extreme values, we drop 7 observations in Experiment 1 that take
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KS Test p−value = .916
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
u
lm
u
la
ti
v
e
 P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
0 20 40 60 80 100
Proposal Offer
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Proposal Offer
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
A
c
c
e
p
ta
n
c
e
 R
a
te
0 25 50 75 100
Proposal Offer from the Proposer
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Conditional Acceptance Rate
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
u
lm
u
la
ti
v
e
 P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
0 20 40 60 80 100
Proposal Offer
Proposal Offer from Roth et al. (1991)
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
A
c
c
e
p
ta
n
c
e
 R
a
te
0 25 50 75 100
Proposal Offer from the Proposer
Conditional Acceptance Rate from Roth et al. (1991)
S5 Fig: Proposal offer and conditional acceptance rates. The blue curves and red curves show the 
distribution of proposal offers and conditional acceptance rates from Experiment 1 and 2, 
respectively. The bottom two panels show the distribution of proposal
offers from Roth et al. (1991).
onds) before either accepting or rejecting a proposal, again conditional on the amount of that
proposal. No matter in Experiment 1 or 2, we observe that acceptance reaction times have
a huge drop when approaching the equal-split allocation, indicating the special appeal of the
equal-split allocation (see Lin et al. (2020)).
Moreover, in Experiment 1, the trend of the reaction time (conditional on accepting) shows
an inverted U-shape peaking at around 30% which they are indifferent between accepting and
rejecting. This observation is consistent with Chabris et al. (2009), Konovalov and Krajbich
(2019) and Krajbich et al. (2014).
more than 88 seconds (= Q3 + 3 × IQR) to respond. Similarly, in Experiment 2, we drop 6 observations that
take more than 90 seconds (= Q3 + 3 × IQR) to respond.
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S6 Fig: The LOWESS estimation of and scatter plot of Respnder’s reaction time. The size of 
the bubbles is weighted by the number of observations.
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B.5 Risk Elicitation
S14 Table: Risk Elicitation Task
N Mean SD Max min
# of safe options
Experiment 1 545 4.396 2.047 0 9
Experiment 2 468 4.891 2.274 0 9
Note: There are 62 players in Experiment 1 and 91 play-
ers in Experiment 2 that are not rationalizable and are
excluded from the table and the following analysis.
The fifth task in the playlist was a multiple price list risk elicitation task based on Holt
and Laury (2002) (which is referred to as the “dice lottery” game in MobLab). Subjects face
10 choices between two lotteries, labeled Option A or Option B (see Section E.3). The main
difference relative to Holt and Laury (2002) is that amounts the amounts at stake for the
different options are slightly different.2 Similar to Holt and Laury (2002), lottery option A in
each pair (the “safe option”) has a lower variance in prize outcomes. The expected payoff of
the safer lottery A is initially greater than that of the high variance lottery choice B, but the
probabilities of receiving the two amounts vary systematically with each choice (in the same
manner as in Holt and Laury (2002)) so that by the third choice our our experiment (the
fourth choice of Holt and Laury (2002)) and continuing through the 10th choice, the expected
payoff from the higher variance lottery is always greater than for the low variance, safe lottery.
Thus, in our experiment a risk neutral player would choose the low variance lottery A for the
first 3 choices and the high variance lottery for the last 7 choices. Departures from this risk
neutral prediction specifically, more than (less than) 3 choices in a row of the low variance
lottery indicate risk averse (risk loving) preferences with respect to uncertain money amounts.
A second difference between our experimental design and that of Holt and Laury (2002) is
that we only allow subjects to switch from choice A to choice B one time (it is also possible
to switch once from choice B to choice A). This design implements a single-crossing and avoid
non-monotonic back and forth switching between the two lottery choices that confounds the
analysis of risk attitudes. Finally, following completion of the Holt and Laury task, we only
report the amount that subjects earned (in points).
S14 Table and S7 Fig summarize the results of this risk
2For option A, the amounts in Holt and Laury (2002) are $2 and $1.60 whereas we have $4 and $5 while for
option B, the amounts in Holt and Laury (2002)are $3.85 and $0.10, whereas we have $10 and $1.
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elicitation task in Experiments 1 and 2. First, we observe that there is only a small amount 
of risk-seeking players in both Experiment 1 and 2 (11.6% in Experiment 1 and 13.0% in 
Experiment 2). Moreover, on average, players in both experiments are more risk averse than 
risk neutral decision makers by 1.395 and 1.891 safe options, which is consistent with the finding 
in Holt and Laury (2002). Finally, from the right panel of S7 Fig, we can find Experiment 2 
players are significantly more risk averse than Experiment 1 players (KS = 0.1341, p < 0.001).
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S7 Fig: The left panel shows the average probability of choosing the safe option. The dotted line 
is the predictions of a risk neutral decision maker. Bars indicate standard error of means. The 
right panel shows the distribution of number of safe options chosen by players in Experiments 1 
and 2. The p-value of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is provided in the figure.
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B.6 Centipede Game
S15 Table: Centipede Game Summary Statistics
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
N Mean SD N Mean SD
Take Rate at Node 1
Round 1 297 0.283 0.451 272 0.246 0.432
Round 2 307 0.368 0.483 276 0.380 0.486
Round 3 306 0.500 0.501 279 0.527 0.500
Take Rate at Node 2
Round 1 190 0.426 0.496 193 0.352 0.479
Round 2 182 0.495 0.501 166 0.386 0.488
Round 3 147 0.510 0.502 130 0.515 0.502
Take Rate at Node 3
Round 1 102 0.637 0.483 117 0.470 0.501
Round 2 91 0.604 0.492 100 0.500 0.503
Round 3 69 0.667 0.475 63 0.444 0.501
The sixth experiment in the playlist was a centipede game, as originally studied by McK-
elvey and Palfrey (1992). In this two-player game, players 1 and 2 take turns choosing either
to “pass” (P) decision-making on to the other player or to “take” (T) the current payoff. See
Section E.3 for the game form we implemented in the experiments.
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium via backward induction is that the first mover,
player 1 chooses Take at the first opportunity ending the game with payoffs of 4 points to
player 1 and 1 point to player 2. However, this prediction is seldom played. McKelvey and
Palfrey (1992) report that only 7% of the first movers chose Take at the first opportunity
in a variant of the same four-node game that we study here. The most regular finding in
experimental tests of this game with inexperienced subjects is that the frequency of “Take”
increases as they move closer to the ending node of the game. A further finding is that
experienced subjects, who have played the game at least once, learn to choose Take earlier
and earlier in the game with repetition.
S15 Table and S8 Fig summarize the results. The figure shows the f requency with which 
players chose Take at nodes 1 (Player 1), 2 (Player 2) and 3 (Player 1) i n both experiments. 
This figure reveals that, consistent with the existing experi-mental literature on the centipede 
game, the f requency of take (“the take rate”) i s s ignificantly
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greater at decision node 2 than at decision node 1 in the first two repetitions of the game. By
the third repetition, however, there is no longer any difference in the frequency of take at node
1 or 2, which is the same at 50%. Thus, even after 3 repetitions, only 50% of pairs are playing
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The latter frequency is consistent with the findings
reported in McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) for the four node centipede game. Interestingly,
the take rate at node 1 in our data set of 28.3% is somewhat higher than the 7.1% take rate
reported in the four-node game of McKelvey and Palfrey (1992).
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S8 Fig: The take rate at each node (conditional on passing at previous nodes) across 
three rounds (with standard error bars).
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B.7 Trust Game
S16 Table: Trust Game Summary Statistics
N Mean SD Median Max min
Experiment 1
Investment 308 29.02 30.72 20 100 0
Return Ratio 219 0.602 0.718 0.322 3 0
Experiment 2
Investment 280 38.48 34.69 25 100 0
Return Ratio 223 0.465 0.604 0.030 3 0
Note: The return ratio is the ratio between amount of return and
the amount of investment from player 1. It would be missing if
player 1 invests nothing.
The seventh experiment in the playlist was a trust game as originally studied by Berg et al.
(1995). In this two-player game, the first mover (investor) is endowed with $100 (100 points)
while the second mover (responder) is endowed with nothing. The investor decides how much
of her endowment to “invest” or “send” to the responder. The amount invested (or sent), I,
if positive, is then tripled. Finally the responder decides how much of the tripled amount, 3I,
to “return” to the investor, R ∈ [0, 3I]. The payoff to the investor is 100 − I + R, and the
payoff to the responder is 3I −R. If this game is played once (as in our study), via backward
induction the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is for the responder to always return
0 and thus for the sender to always send 0. However, as Berg et al. (1995) first reported, this
is not what happens in the one-shot game. They found that investors sent, on average, 51.6%
of their $10 endowment, while the average amount returned by responders was about 90% of
the amount invested I (or 30% of the tripled investment amount, 3I).
We observe similar, but slightly different results in the data from our Xiamen experiment as 
reported on in S16 Table and S9 Fig. The mean amount invested was 29.02 in Experiment 1 and 
38.48 in Experiment 2. Moreover, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that the distribution of 
investment in Experiment 1 is significantly different from the distribution in Experiment 2 (KS 
= 0.1669, p < 0.001), indicating the investment in Experiment 2 is larger. The mean ratio of the 
amount returned to the amount invested is on average, 60.24% in Experiment 1 and 46.53% in 
Experiment 2 which are less than the 90% average of Berg et al. (1995) and the return rate 
decreases with the invested amount. Specifically, a no-intercept regression of the return amount 
on the investment amount, as
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plotted in S9 Fig, has a positive and significant slope coefficient of 0.707 (βˆ = 0.707, t = 7.97, p 
< 0.001, 95% C.I. = [0.533, 0.882]) for Experiment 1 and 0.680 (βˆ = 0.680, t = 8.66, p < 0.001, 
95% C.I. = [0.526, 0.834]) for Experiment 2.
KS Test p−value < 0.001
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S9 Fig: The left panel shows the cumulative probability function of invest-ment from 
Experiment 1 and 2. The p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is shown in the figure. The 
right panel shows the amount of returns conditional on the investment from the investor.
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C Gender
C.1 Beauty Contest Game
S17 Table: Beauty Contest Game Summary Statistics
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median
Initial Guess
Female 295 36.73 21.39 34.0 417 37.60 21.44 35.0
Male 112 26.05 19.02 22.5 119 33.08 19.15 33.0
KS Test p−value < .001
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S10 Fig: Cumulative density function of initial guesses divided by gender. The median guesses of 
large and small groups are labeled in dashed lines. The p-value of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test 
is shown at the bottom of each figure.
In this section, we consider gender differences in the initial guess of the beauty contest
game. Gender differences have been the focus of many experimental studies (see, e.g., Croson
and Gneezy (2009)), and so we will also consider the evidence for gender differences in several
of the games of our experiment as well. We focus on initial guess in the beauty contest game,
as that is the only period for which decisions are not affected by feedback on the choices made
by others and thus provides the cleanest test of gender differences. For this same reason,
we will also use the first period beauty contest guesses to classify players in terms of their
strategic sophistication as well (see Supplementary Section D.1).
S17 Table reports the summary statistics and S10 Fig shows male and female players’ 
CDFs. From the Figure, we can observe that in Experiment
26
1, the females’ initial guesses tend to be higher (further away from the equilibrium) than the
males’. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms that the distribution of initial guesses by females
and males is not the same (KS = 0.2620, p < 0.001) favoring the alternative view that female
guesses are higher, on average. Yet, in Experiment 2, the null hypothesis can only be rejected
at p = 0.1 significant level (KS = 0.1267, p = 0.082).
This finding is consistent with some, but not all studies exploring gender differences in
beauty contest games. For instance, Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2017) find that males employ
more steps of iterated reasoning than do females in BC games without monetary incentives,
but these differences disappear with monetary incentives. Perhaps more relevant to our find-
ings, Qin (2020) repeats the design of Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2017) on Chinese university
students and finds that males employ greater steps of iterated reasoning than do females, even
with monetary incentives.
C.2 Ultimatum Game
S18 Table: Ultimatum Game Summary Statistics
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
N Mean SD N Mean SD
Proposal Offer
Female 235 37.56 14.29 211 37.73 14.75
Male 77 31.94 18.07 59 35.34 18.35
Acceptance Rate
Female 225 0.711 0.454 207 0.792 0.407
Male 77 0.662 0.476 58 0.741 0.442
Here we analyze the gender difference in the ultimatum game. S18 Table reports the 
summary statistics in both Experiments 1 and 2. Moreover, S11 Fig shows the distribution of 
proposal offers and the conditional acceptance rates (conditional on the proposal offers from the 
proposer).
First of all, we can see the left panels of S11 Fig that male proposers offer significantly less 
than female proposers in Experiment 1 (KS Test: KS = 0.1822, p = 0.030) but not in 
Experiment 2 (KS Test: KS = 0.0994, p = 0.695). In other words, the result of the KS test 
implies that females in the first mover role offer more in Experiment 1 but there is no gender 
difference in Experiment 2.
The right panels of S11 Fig plot the conditional acceptance rates for
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males and females. In Experiment 1, we can observe that for the conditional acceptance rate,
females and males have similar slopes before 50 (β̂Male = 0.014, t = 4.02, p < 0.001, 95% C.I. =
[0.007, 0.021] and β̂Female = 0.018, t = 8.58, p < 0.001, 95% C.I. = [0.014, 0.022]). Also, both
females and males tend to accept any offers above 50.
Experiment 2 replicates this observation. We find that females and males have similar
slopes before 50 (β̂Male = 0.023, t = 6.96, p < 0.001, 95% C.I. = [0.017, 0.030] and β̂Female =
0.019, t = 10.55, p < 0.001, 95% C.I. = [0.015, 0.022]). Finally, we also observe that both
females and males would accept any offers above 50. This result shows that there is no gender
difference in conditional acceptance rates in both Experiments 1 and 2.
KS Test p−value = .03
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S11 Fig: Proposal offers and acceptance rates divided by gender.
C.3 Risk Elicitation Task
In this section, we analyze whether there is any gender difference in risk preference in our data 
set. The average number of safe options in each case is reported in S19 Table and the 
distributions are shown in S12 Fig
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S19 Table: Risk Preference Summary Statistics
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
N Mean SD N Mean SD
# of safe options
Female 403 4.467 2.066 348 5.144 2.217
Male 142 4.197 1.987 105 4.095 2.356
In Experiment 1, a KS test of the null hypothesis of no difference in the distribution of
choices between males and females cannot be rejected (KS = 0.0693, p = 0.651). However,
the null hypothesis is rejected in Experiment 2 (KS = 0.2180, p = 0.001). Our finding from
Experiments 1 and 2 is consistent with the mixed evidence that has been found for gender
differences in risk aversion using multiple price lists and other tasks, see, e.g., Filippin and
Crosetto (2016).
KS Test p−value = .651
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
u
lm
u
la
ti
v
e
 P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
# of Safe Options
Male Player
Female Player
Experiment 1 Risk Preference
KS Test p−value = .001
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
u
lm
u
la
ti
v
e
 P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
# of Safe Options
Male Player
Female Player
Experiment 2 Risk Preference
S12 Fig: The distribution of number of safe options chosen by male and female players in 
Experiment 1 and 2.
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C.4 Centipede Game
S20 Table: Centipede Game Summary Statistics
Experiment 1
Male
Experiment 1
Female
Experiment 2
Male
Experiment 2
Female
N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
Take Rate at Node 1
Round 1 78 0.321 0.470 218 0.266 0.443 50 0.200 0.404 210 0.238 0.427
Round 2 82 0.390 0.491 224 0.357 0.480 51 0.373 0.488 213 0.380 0.487
Round 3 81 0.543 0.501 224 0.482 0.501 52 0.442 0.502 215 0.540 0.500
Take Rate at Node 2
Round 1 44 0.477 0.505 146 0.411 0.494 46 0.283 0.455 142 0.366 0.483
Round 2 38 0.553 0.504 144 0.479 0.501 39 0.308 0.468 125 0.416 0.495
Round 3 36 0.472 0.506 111 0.523 0.502 38 0.526 0.506 90 0.522 0.502
Take Rate at Node 3
Round 1 31 0.645 0.486 71 0.634 0.485 27 0.481 0.509 85 0.459 0.501
Round 2 21 0.619 0.498 70 0.600 0.493 19 0.421 0.507 78 0.526 0.503
Round 3 18 0.611 0.501 51 0.686 0.469 15 0.267 0.458 47 0.511 0.505
This section investigates whether there is any gender difference in the centipede game. First 
of all, the summary statistics are reported in S20 Table and the data are visualized in S13 Fig.
From the data, we can observe that the patterns are similar in Experiments 1 and 2 and 
for both male and female players. We find that in both Experiments 1 and 2, the players are 
more likely to choose “Take” earlier in later rounds. If we disaggregate by gender as is done in 
the S13 Fig, we can find by the third round there is no difference in the take frequencies at nodes 
1 and 2 between males and females, with both rates being approximately
50%.
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S13 Fig: The take rate at each node (conditional on passing at previous nodes) across 
three rounds (with standard error bars) for male and female players.
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C.5 Trust Game
S21 Table: Trust Game
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
N Mean SD N Mean SD
Investment
Female 227 24.81 25.96 215 34.66 32.43
Male 81 40.84 39.08 62 52.19 39.59
Return Ratio
Female 166 0.564 0.633 166 0.457 0.601
Male 52 0.737 0.938 45 0.486 0.649
Note: The return ratio is the ratio between amount of return
and the amount of investment from player 1. It would be miss-
ing if player 1 invests nothing.
In this section, we explore the gender difference in the trust game. First of all, S21 Table 
reports the summary statistics. We can observe that in both Experiments 1 and 2, male 
investors tend to invest more than female players while there is no gender difference in return.
S14 Fig also reveals evidence of gender differences in Investment deci-sions. In Experiment 1, 
we find that female investors invest less, on average 24.81, while male investors invest on 
average more, 40.84. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reveals that we can reject the null hypotheses 
(KS = 0.2612, p < 0.001) that the distribution of investment amounts by gender is the same in 
favor of the alternative that females invest less. Similarly, we find that a Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test can reject the null hypotheses (KS = 0.2854, p < 0.001) in Experiment 2.
As for the return rate, there appears to be no gender difference here, as the estimated re-
gression lines of return on investment are essentially the same for females and males. In
Experiment 1, the estimated slope for male player 2 is 0.696 (β̂ = 0.696, t = 3.41, p =
0.001, 95% C.I. = [0.293, 1.099]) while the slope for female player 2 only differs by 0.016
(t = 0.07, p = 0.944, 95% C.I. = [−0.425, 0.456]). On the other hand, we find a similar
pattern in Experiment 2. The estimated slope for male player 2 is 0.650 (β̂ = 0.650, t =
3.77, p < 0.001, 95% C.I. = [0.310, 0.989]) while the slope for female player 2 only differs by
0.060 (t = 0.30, p = 0.762, 95% C.I. = [−0.327, 0.446]).
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KS Test p−value < 0.001
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S14 Fig: The left panels show the cumulative probability functions of invest-ment for male and 
female players. The p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is shown in the figure. The right 
panels show the amount of returns conditional on the investment from the investor.
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C.6 Math Competition
The final experiment in the playlist was a game exploring gender differences in the choice
between piece-rate and tournament compensation schemes as originally studied by Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007). Here we implemented a MobLab variant of this game called “Math
Competition.”
In the first stage of this 3-stage, individual choice game, subjects have three minutes to
solve as many addition puzzles as they can. In each puzzle, they are presented with nine,
two-digit numbers and they have to find (click on) the two numbers among the nine that
exactly add up to 100. In this stage, they get 1 point per correct answer, and so this stage is
known as the “piece rate” compensation scheme.
They then move on to a second stage where face the same, 3-minute task of solving the
same type of addition puzzles as in the first stage, but in this second stage they compete
with three other robot players. These robot players are programmed to mimic the play of
actual human subjects in terms of the number of addition puzzle tasks they can complete
in 3 minutes. Thus, this second stage comprises the “tournament” compensation scheme.
The human subject gets the same number of points per correct answer as in the piece rate
treatment, and receives 4 times this number of points, but only if he/she wins the tournament,
that is, if he/she solves more puzzles in the three minute time period than do the three other
robot players. Otherwise earnings are 0 in the tournament scheme.
Finally, prior to the third and final stage, subjects have to decide whether or not they want
the third stage of this task to be the piece rate or the tournament environment. This choice
is the primary outcome variable of interest to researchers conducting such experiments. After
making their binary choice (piece rate or tournament), subjects then participate in 3 minutes
of their chosen task with the same incentive structures as described earlier.
The main finding from a similar study by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) is that while 
there is no difference in performance between men and women in the piece rate or the tourna-
ment compensation settings, when given a choice, women disproportionately prefer the piece 
rate compensation scheme while men prefer the tournament scheme. Specifically, they find 
that 73 percent of men but only 35 percent of women choose the tournament. While our 
experiment differs in several respects from Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)3, we nevertheless 
obtain qualitatively similar findings as reported on in S15 Fig.
3They compared balanced groups of 2 women and 2 men while our experiment is an individual choice task,
where subjects play against robot players in the tournament. Our addition task of choosing two numbers out
of nine that sum to 100 is different from their task of of adding up adding up as many sets of five two-digit
numbers in five minutes as possible. Furthermore, in contrast to Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), our subject
pool is not gender-balanced.
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In Experiment 1, we find that 62.2% (N = 156, S.D. = 0.487) of male players choose the
tournament while only 46.4% (N = 463, S.D. = 0.499) for female players (Mann-Whitney
Rank-sum Test: p < 0.001). Further, if we break down the tournament choice according to
whether the player won or lost the tournament in stage 2, we observe that conditional on
losing the tournament men are significantly more likely to choose the tournament than are
women (p < 0.001). However, conditional on winning the tournament, we find no gender
difference in the willingness to choose the tournament (p > 0.10). In addition, we find similar
results in Experiment 2 where 52.9% (N = 119, S.D. = 0.501) of male players choose the
tournament while 39.8% (N = 420, S.D. = 0.490) for female players (Mann-Whitney Rank-
sum Test: p = 0.010). Also, conditional on winning the tournament, we do not find any
gender difference (p = 0.780) but males players are more likely to choose tournament than
female players conditional on losing in the second stage (p = 0.057).
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S15 Fig: The left panels show the probability of choosing tournament for female and male 
players. The right panels show the probability of choosing the tournament conditional on the 
result of stage two. The p-values of Mann–Whitney rank-sum tests are provided in the figures.
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D Behavior Across Games
Over the past three decades, behavioral and experimental economists have made huge progress
in identifying the stylized facts of these games (see Camerer (2003)). However, an empirical
understanding of how strategic behavior varies across these games remains an open question.
The multi-game protocol of our experiment allows us to observe each player’s strategic
profile across many different games and hence to look for an empirical relationship in strategic
behavior between games. If a player follows the Nash Equilibrium, then he might believe his
opponents are also rational and best respond to such a belief. Moreover, he has to believe
his opponents would also best respond to a rational strategic profile so that the choices and
beliefs are consistent in equilibrium, yielding perfect behavioral correlations across games.
Reaching an equilibrium requires that all players behave fully rationally. If this is not the
case, players may choose non-equilibrium strategies and correlations in behavior across games
are weakened. For instance, Agranov et al. (2012) and Alaoui and Penta (2016) suggest that
observed strategic sophistication are not only determined by the reasoning ability of subjects
but also by their beliefs about opponents’ sophistication. Psychological factors other than
bounded rationality, such as social preferences, can also drive players to deviate from the
equilibrium. However, it is not clear if there is any association in dis-equilibrium behavior
across different games. Here we take advantage of our design to investigate correlations in
strategic measures across games or attributes.
Specifically, we use two approaches to analyze these correlations. First, we explore how
an individual’s sophistication level, as classified by their first guesses in the p-beauty contest
game (also their first choice in the experiment), is correlated with their behavior in the other
seven games by a subsample analysis. Second, we compute pairwise Spearman’s rank-order
correlation coefficients of raw choices in each of the eight games/tasks to summarize the
empirical relationship across all games.
D.1 Subsample Analysis
Using the different level type classifications, we report on the mean and 95% CI of various 
choice and other variables disaggregated by the level type classified by players’ initial guesses 
(see S3 Fig). The sixteen variables that we analyze in this section are sum-marized in S4 Table. In 
S16 Fig, we look at the relationship between personal characteristics and level types. For 
instance, in the first panel, we look at how the mean and standard error of the standardized 
Gaokao score varies with level type. We can observe that see higher levels tend to have higher 
Gaokao scores in Experiment 2
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(Non-parametric trend test: p = 0.033) but not in Experiment 1 (Non-parametric trend test:
p = 0.205). In addition, the only personal characteristic displaying a clear trend in Experi-
ment 1 is gender (Non-parametric trend test: p < 0.001), indicating the proportion of female
players is smaller in higher levels.
Exp 1 NP Trend Test: p = 0.205
Exp 2 NP Trend Test: p = 0.027
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S16 Fig: Mean of basic variables for each level in the beauty contest game. Bars indicate the 95% 
CI. The p-values of non-parametric trend tests are provided in the figures.
S17 Fig reports on the association between various strategic choices and beauty contest 
levels using the same format as in S16 Fig. Here we find several interesting and significant 
trends. In Experiment 1, we find that higher level players are (1) more likely to make voter 
turnout choices according to the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) prediction (Non-
parametric trend test: p = 0.018), (2) more likely to perform strong free-riding behavior (Non-
parametric trend test: p < 0.001), and (3) more likely to offer less in the ultimatum game (Non-
parametric trend test: p = 0.003). On the other hand, in the Experiment 2, we also find higher 
level players are more likely to perform free-riding behavior and offer less in the ultimatum 
game.
Broadly speaking, the monotonic trends are similar across experiments, suggesting that
the underlying cause of the correlations is immune to the experimental population. Focusing
on the strategic measures with significant trends, we find that the pattern is consistent with
the direction of Nash equilibrium—more sophisticated players are more likely to choose the
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S17 Fig: Mean of strategic behavior for each level in the beauty contest game. Bars indicate the 
95% CI. The p-values of non-parametric trend tests are provided in the figures.
strictly dominant strategy of contributing nothing in the public goods game and their offers
are closer to the subgame perfect equilibrium in the ultimatum game. This demonstrates the
predictive power of the equilibrium while its sensitivity to the beliefs about other players’
behavior.
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D.2 Spearman’s Rank-Order Correlation Coefficients
S18 Fig: Pairwise Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficients of strategic behavior. Color-
coded correlation coefficients indicate significance with Bonferroni corrections. We use warm 
colors for positive correlations and cold colors for negative correlations. A darker color implies 
the correlation coefficient is more statistically significant. The left panel shows the correlation 
matrix for Experiment 1 and the right panel is for Experiment 2.
S18 Fig summarizes the pairwise Spearman’s rank-order correlation co-efficients for the 7 
measures used in the prior section. We apply the Bonferroni correction to counteract the 
problem of multiple comparisons for the significance testing of the correlation coefficients.
Similar to the subsample analysis, we observe a significant negative correlation between
the initial guess and strong free-riding behavior (Experiment 1: ρ = −0.2129, p = 0.0003;
Experiment 2: ρ = −0.1458, p = 0.0136). Moreover, proposers who offer less in the ultimatum
game are more likely to be a strong free-riders (Experiment 1: ρ = −0.1606, p = 0.0923;
Experiment 2: ρ = −0.2076, p = 0.0106). This result suggests that the players tend to
adopt similar reasoning processes in the beauty contest game, the public good game and the
ultimatum game—which is consistently in the direction of the Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, S18 Fig shows that the more risk averse players are signifi-cantly less likely to 
be strong free riders (Experiment 1: ρ = −0.1380, p = 0.0261; Experiment 2: ρ = −0.1713, p = 
0.0011). This significant correlation is unexpected from the perspective of equilibrium since 
being a strong free-rider is a strictly dominant strategy. That is, a payoff maximizing player 
should choose this regardless of his risk preference. This finding suggests that while Nash 
equilibrium has predictive power in understanding dis-equilibrium behavior, it cannot be the 
sole explanation. Alternatively, models with social image concerns can support
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such an empirical relationship if players believe there is a non-trivial probability that their
behavior is “observed”—viz. the “audience effect” (see Andreoni and Bernheim (2009)).
Finally, the insignificant correlation between the risk preference measure and the amount
of investment in the trust game is consistent with the finding in Dean and Ortoleva (2019).
Conceptually, sending money to another player in the first stage of the trust game is an
uncertain prospect and hence the correlation between investment and risk aversion is plausible.
Yet, the insignificance indicates the players in the trust game do not view the investment as
a gamble. Instead, the weak correlation between the investment amount and the take rate in
the centipede game that we found in Experiment 2 (ρ = −0.2472, p = 0.0755) suggests that
investment behavior is potentially related to the belief forming ability in a multi-stage game.
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E Method
In this section, we first provide some general information about the participants and the
experimental implementation. In addition, we provide the instruction slides and screenshots
of all games in the second subsection. Finally, the details of game configurations are reported
in the last subsection.
E.1 Background of Participants and Experimental Implementation
For both Experiment 1 and 2, subjects were recruited from a group of college students partic-
ipating in an economic summer camp at Xiamen University. Participants were students who
just completed their third year of university study and wanted to go to graduate school for
a master or Ph.D degree. They applied with references from their own university and were
selected by the School of Economics at Xiamen University for a 5-day summer camp. The
summer camp includes the first 2-day lectures by faculty members to introduce all the fields in
economics at Xiamen University and the following 3-day exams for the qualification of entering
the graduate programs of economics at Xiamen University without taking the national entry
exams for graduate schools. Due to COVID-19, the summer camp in 2020 and the experiment
were held online.
Both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were conducted through MobLab which is an online
educational platform for conducting economics experiments. The eight games we used in
the experiment were pre-programmed by MobLab. Experiment 1 was a large scale in-person
experiment which was conducted as one of the 2-day lectures for a duration of 2 hours on
the morning of the first day of the summer camp. On the other hand, Experiment 2 was
conducted online. They were notified that their performance in the experiment would not
affect the evaluation of their qualification.
Students were asked to install the app of the online platform (MobLab) and register for the
experiment on their phone two days before the actual experiment session. A welcome survey
on the app was conducted one day before the experiment session to confirm the installation
and registration. There were 633 players who at least participated in one of the eight games
in Experiment 1 and 585 players in Experiment 2.
Experiment 1 began with a 15-minute introduction to experimental economics and the
experimental lab and the research group at Xiamen University, followed by a 2-hour session of
online experiment in an auditorium with a capacity of 800 seats. The experiment instructor
explained the games one by one using slides (see section E.2) on two large screens and there
were 18 well trained research assistants each in charge of one section of auditorium to help
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students with any technical or game related questions during the experiment. The 18 research
assistants were undergraduate or graduate students at Xiamen University and had been trained
in three one-hour long sessions by MobLab team members before the experiment.
Experiment 2 was an online experiment. The experimenter explained the instructions via
Dingtalk which was a communication and collaboration platform which supports large-scale
video conferences. The subjects can start joining the live video conference on Dingtalk 30
minutes before the experiment. During the experiment, the experimenter shared the screen
for the experimental instruction and followed the same procedure as Experiment 1. There
were 24 well-trained research assistants online helping students with any technical or game
related questions during the experiment.
At the beginning of both experiments, we communicated to subjects that their decisions
and corresponding points earned from all games would be incorporated into their final pay-
ment. They were told to expect a show-up payment of 10 CNY for participating in the
experiment. The average payoff per game was 3 CNY with a final payment being the sum
of their show-up payment and total payoff across all 8 games. In Experiment 1 and 2, the
overall average total payment was 37.61 CNY (≈ 5.42 USD) and 40.00 CNY (≈ 5.77 USD),
respectively, or roughly the equivalent of 2 hours of work as an TA in China. Subjects were
paid on Alipay, the payments platform of Alibaba, which is ubiquitous in China and is also
the world’s largest mobile payment platform. Their account information was collected before
the experiment with consent and was only used for this experiment.
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E.2 Instruction Slides
In this section, we provide the instruction slides and screenshots of each stage in all games.
S19 Fig shows the i nstructions of the beauty contest game. The experi-menter first explains 
the rule with S19A Fig, and then i ntroduces the game i nterface with S19B-S19D Fig.  Similarly, 
the experimenter explains the rest of the games with S20 Fig to S26 Fig.
The experimenter provided each instruction at the beginning of that game. The subjects
are told that their final reward depends on their performance in all games and the they will
be paid through Alipay after the experiment.
S19 Fig: Instruction slides and screenshots of the beauty contest game. (A) Overview of the 
rules. (B) Player’s initial screen. (C) shows that the decision can be made by moving the
slider. (D) reminds the players to click the “submit” bottom to submit their decision.
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S20 Fig: Instruction slides and screenshots of the voter turnout game. (A) Overview of the rules. 
(B) Player’s initial screen. (C) shows that the players can either “vote” or “abstain.” (D) The 
cost of voting and the payoff are provided in the screen.
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S21 Fig: Instruction slides and screenshots of the public good game. (A) Overview of the rules. 
(B) Player’s initial screen. (C) shows that the decision can be made by moving the slider. (D) 
An example of payoff calculation.
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S22 Fig: Instruction slides and screenshots of the ultimatum game. (A) Overview of the 
rules. (B) Proposer’s decision screen. (C) Responder’s decision screen.
S23 Fig: Instruction slides and screenshots of the risk elicitation task. (A) Overview of the 
rules. (B) shows the restriction that the players can only switch at most once.
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S24 Fig: Instruction slides and screenshots of the centipede game. (A) Overview of the 
game tree. (B) shows that the players can either “take” or “pass.”
S25 Fig: Instruction slides and screenshots of the trust game. (A) Investor’s decision screen. 
(B) Returner’s decision screen.
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S26 Fig: Instruction slides and screenshots of the math competition game.(A) The initial screen 
of round one (piece rate). (B) Overview of the task. (C) The initial screen of round one 
(tournament). (D) Player’s decision screen for the payoff scheme in round three.
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E.3 Game Configurations
In this section, we provide the description of the game configurations in our experiment. Notice
that we implement the same playlist in the same order in Experiment 1 and 2.
1. An N-player p-beauty contest game, where p = 2/3 and range is [0, 100] played 3 rounds.
N = 100 in group A and N = 10 in group B.
2. An N-player voter turnout game played 3 rounds. The party distribution (majority vs.
minority) is 2 to 1. The payoff of winning the election is 100 and losing the election is
0. The cost of voting is uniformly distributed from 0 to 80. N = 100 in group A and
N = 10 in group B.
3. An N-player linear public good game played for 8 rounds. The endowment is 20 units
and MPCR is 30%. N = 100 in group A and N = 10 in group B.
4. A 2-player ultimatum bargaining game played once. The pie size is 100 units.
5. An individual, Holt-Laury risk elicitation task, played once. The configuration is shown in 
S22 Table. Notice that the decision maker can only switch between two options once.
S22 Table: Risk Elicitation Task
Option A Option B
Expected Payoff
Difference
1/10 of $5, 9/10 of $4 1/10 of $10, 9/10 of $1 $2.2
2/10 of $5, 8/10 of $4 2/10 of $10, 8/10 of $1 $1.4
3/10 of $5, 7/10 of $4 3/10 of $10, 7/10 of $1 $0.6
4/10 of $5, 6/10 of $4 4/10 of $10, 6/10 of $1 -$0.2
5/10 of $5, 5/10 of $4 5/10 of $10, 5/10 of $1 -$1.0
6/10 of $5, 4/10 of $4 6/10 of $10, 4/10 of $1 -$1.8
7/10 of $5, 3/10 of $4 7/10 of $10, 3/10 of $1 -$2.6
8/10 of $5, 2/10 of $4 8/10 of $10, 2/10 of $1 -$3.4
9/10 of $5, 1/10 of $4 9/10 of $10, 1/10 of $1 -$4.2
10/10 of $5, 0/10 of $4 10/10 of $10, 0/10 of $1 -$5.0
6. A 2-player centipede game, played 3 rounds. The game tree is shown in S27 Fig.
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T
P
T
P
T
P
T
P
(4, 1) (2, 8) (16, 4) (8, 32)
(64, 16)
S27 Fig: The 2-player, 4 decision node centipede game. Payoffs in points to (Player 1, Player 2) 
are shown at the end of each terminal node.
7. A 2-player trust game, played once. Player 1 has endowment 100 units and player 2 has
no endowment. The multiplier for player 1’s investment is 3.
8. An individual, 3-stage real-effort task (called “math competition”) exploring gender
differences in compensation schemes. The compensation schemes for stage 1 and stage
2 are “piece rate” and “tournament,” respectively. Before the third stage, the decision
maker can decide either one to be the compensation scheme for the final stage.
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